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Abstract 
Metropolitan areas are a typical and increasingly discussed example for fragmented governance 
lacking clear accountability structures.  While most of the literature has focused on the legitimacy of 
institutions and actors so far, we add a communicational dimension to democratic accountability. In 
this regard we argue that public accountability/ or accountability through the mass media has 
become a democratic standard that can be measured/ analyzed. Comparing two types of 
metropolitan governance in four countries, we test a theoretical and an empirical hypothesis 
regarding media’s ability to be a forum for public accountability. First, we argue that the media 
points out who is responsible for policy decisions in a way that mirrors governance structures. By 
pointing out who is responsible for policy making processes, public accountability reduces the 
complexity of network governance and actors can be held accountable. Second, however, we expect 
that the media are biased in focusing more on elected actors because due to their institutional/ 
political accountability they are more visible and thus easier to be held accountable. Analysing 
newspaper content data, we come to a mixed conclusion. While both elected and non-elected policy-
actors are visible in the media, elected actors are more often attributed with responsibility and 
blamed than they are actually responsible. Unelected actors are not only outside of the chain of 
delegation in governance structures, they are also less in the focus of public control. Hence, although 
non-elected actors are less in the focus of public control, the mass media compensate their 
institutional lack of accountability by holding them accountable in public.   
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1. Introduction1: metropolitan governance and the question of 
democracy 
Across the world, the twin forces of globalisation and urbanisation have led to the emergence of 
urban regions as functionally integrated territorial systems of economic production and social 
reproduction. These metropolitan areas have become the dominant form of human settlement, not 
only in OECD countries, but increasingly so in less developed countries (Hoffmann-Martinot and 
Sellers, 2005). But they not only constitute the spatial environment for an increasing majority of the 
world’s citizens. More and more, they also become relevant spaces for politics and policies. 
Metropolitan areas usually are the economic powerhouses of national economies. They are 
privileged business locations because they provide the assets that are critical to the accumulation of 
wealth in the knowledge-based economy: a high-skilled workforce, transport and communication 
connections to the rest of the world, as well as clusters of competence in research and development. 
Metropolitan areas are the gateways to the world economy and, as such, crucial for globalised 
capitalism. They are the territorial scale at which the “dirty work of globalization (and 
neoliberalization) is done” (Keil, 2000), i.e. where public policies are defined an implemented in order 
to ensure the competitiveness of national economies at a global level. Among these, services in the 
field of transportation are important, as they secure connectivity and accessibility of a metropolitan 
area, as well as activities in the field of economic development, as they help to attract new 
businesses to the area and/or strengthen existing economic clusters. It is against this background 
that some scholars argue that a reterritorialisation of state spaces at the scale of the metropolitan 
area is taking place (most prominentlyBrenner, 2004). In response to pressures stemming from 
advanced global capitalism, they argue, state authorities across the world have developed strategies 
aimed at increasing governance capacity at the level of metropolitan areas (Brenner, 1999), (Brenner, 
2003, Scott, 2001). The strengthening of metropolitan governance thus appears as a very significant 
example for processes of “downwards” denationalization. 
However, the strengthening of metropolitan governance is not a simple task. The basic problem is 
that metropolitan areas are generally very fragmented spaces. Metropolitan areas are cities that 
have grown by spatial extension, independently from institutional boundaries. Today’s metropolitan 
areas span over large numbers of local jurisdictions or other subnational government territories; 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on research conducted in the project "Cleavages, governance and the media in European metropolitan 
areas", funded by the Swiss National Fund in the NCCR Democracy framework. The authors acknowledge research 
assistance by Christopher Goodman, Chrstian Schalch, Su Yun Woo, Nina Astfalck and Nadja Hauser in the coding of the 
media content data. 
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sometimes they even stretch across the boundaries of national states. They are characterised by 
“geopolitical” (Zeigler and Brunn, 1980) and “governmental” (Dente, 1990) fragmentation that poses 
serious challenges to effective policy-making. In fact, the question of the territorial organisation of 
metropolitan areas has sparked a long running debate in urban social science (see Savitch and Vogel, 
2009, Kübler, 2012). During much of the 20th century, this debate has been characterised by a fierce 
dispute between the so-called metropolitan reform tradition and the public choice approach about 
the pros and cons of institutional consolidation (Ostrom, 1972, Lefèvre, 1998),(Lowery, 1999), i.e. the 
creation of strong metropolitan governments versus the promotion of undistorted competition 
between autonomous localities. Since the 1990s however, researchers have increasingly emphasised 
the role of policy networks in policy-making at the metropolitan scale, and they have thus discovered 
a “new regionalism” (Savitch and Vogel, 2000, Frisken and Norris, 2001). As it turned out, hierarchical 
decision-making by governmental institutions is not the only way to ensure area-wide coordination in 
metropolitan policy-making. Instead, many metropolitan areas across the world heavily rely on non-
hierarchical forms of coordination and cooperation, where political actors act on the basis of 
agreements reached by negotiation. This observation echoes work on multi-level governance in 
Europe (see Hooghe and Marks, 2003) showing that negotiation in joint-decision systems (Scharpf, 
1997) is paramount to coherent policy-making between a variety of interdependent governmental 
and non-governmental policy actors across different state levels. This means that most metropolitan 
areas in the world have been able to strengthen their area-wide governing capacity even though full-
fledged “metropolitan governments” (Sharpe, 1995) - advocated by the metropolitan reform 
tradition or the “old regionalism” approach - will remain a distant dream. With respect to the 
effectiveness and quality of public services at the metropolitan-level new regionalism, understood as 
area-wide policy-coordination flowing from complex network governance, has been shown to 
provide a valid alternative for area-wide policy-making in a context of geopolitical fragmentation (see 
Kübler, 2005). 
Governance capacity in metropolitan areas can thus be seen to rest on different strategies.  Some 
metropolitan areas simply rely on largely self-regulated competition between autonomous localities - 
this is the pure public choice solution (see Tiebout, 1956) and has been followed as an explicit 
strategy only in a very limited number of examples (Frey and Eichenberger, 2001). Others have 
reformed the existing territorial institutions either via municipal amalgamation or via the creation of 
new metropolitan scale of government: an area-wide general purpose institution with strong powers, 
resources and electoral representation. There are quite a few empirical examples of such 
metropolitan governments, such as Portland Metro and the Twin Cities in the USA, the French 
communautés urbaines, the Greater London Authority in England, as well as the Regionalverbände 
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Stuttgart and Hanover in Germany. Scholars have argued that, in cases where the spatial extension of 
the metropolitan areas coincided more or less with the boundaries of sub-national state-levels above 
the municipalities, these existing institutions have become functional equivalents to a metropolitan 
government, as is the case of the Comunidàd Autònoma in the Madrid metropolitan area, or of the 
Kanton in the Zurich metropolitan area (Jouve, 2003). Finally, the third - new regionalist - approach 
to the challenges of area-wide policy-making has consisted in strengthening arenas of 
intergovernmental coordination and in widening the scope of actors associated in policy-making. 
Empirically, the new regionalist approach is clearly the most widely followed. Given the widespread 
resistance to consolidationist reforms (Lefèvre, 2001), the new regionalist approach often appeared 
as a pragmatic solution to the challenges of metropolitan policy-making in spite of inabilities of 
institutional reforms.  
In terms of their empirical relevance, the model of metropolitan government, as well as the new 
regionalist model, are the two main answers how policy-making in metropolitan areas has adapted 
to functional regionalization. The contrast between these two models echoes the distinction 
between traditional modes of government and new forms of network-based interactive governance 
(Klijn, 2008), or, to take up the well-known distinction by Hooghe and Marks (2003): between type I 
and type II governance. And it makes clear that metropolitan policy-making represents a promising 
example for studying the differences between these two types of governance, as well as possible 
implications of new forms of network governance (or: type II governance). This is exactly what this 
paper is about. Drawing on eight metropolitan areas in four countries - in each country, one 
metropolitan area with a metropolitan government was chosen as well as a metropolitan area that 
follows a new regionalist approach- we examine the democratic impact of new modes of 
governance. More precisely, the goal is to analyse to what extent public accountability of 
metropolitan policy-making as reflected in media coverage is related to the differences in the 
underlying models (metropolitan government versus new regionalism). We proceed in four steps. 
Section 2 develops the analytical perspective and lays out the main research question and 
hypotheses. Section 3 gives an overview of research design and data. Section 4 reports results on the 
involvement of different types of actors in metropolitan policy-making, their visibility the media 
reports, as well as the public attribution of responsibility to them.  
2. Beyond the institutional perspective: the role of the media in new 
regionalism 
As other forms of network governance in complex environments (Papadopoulos, 2003) new 
regionalism is often condemned as problematic with respect to democratic accountability.  New 
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regionalism indeed relies on governance networks that involve non-elected actors in decision-
making, whose democratic accountability is not evident, most notably for the electorate.  It is via 
their public visibility that policy actors' responsibility can be clarified and identified by the electorate 
(cf. Powell and Whitten 1993). From the perspective of the electorate, elections are peaks of public 
visibility of policy actors who stand for (re)elections. Elections thus are institutional features which 
are likely to affect the public visibility of responsibility  
This is the reason why, similar to work on other instances of network governance, research on the 
democratic quality of new regionalism has mainly focused on institutional aspects of democratic 
accountability, most notably the role of democratically elected representatives in policy-making at 
the metropolitan level. This perspective rests on the argument that the democratic quality of 
network governance depends on its 'anchorage' in representative institutions and democratic 
practice (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). Results of research in this vein suggests that new regionalism 
is wrought with democratic deficits. Examining institutional mechanisms of democratic control over 
metropolitan policy-making Kübler and Schwab (2007) have shown that, while new regionalism 
increases inclusiveness of metropolitan policy-making by involving civil society actors, it results in 
blurring democratic accountability as policy responsibility is diluted among a large variety of policy-
actors not all of whom are electorally accountable. When area-wide governance relies on policy 
networks, democratically elected local councillors lose grip, and input-legitimacy is reduced (Plüss, 
2013). A historical study focusing on the change of mechanisms of institutionalised democratic 
control has shown that functional cooperation in metropolitan policy-making was often paralleled by 
a retreat of electoral (and/or direct democratic) politics to the benefit of de-politicised technocratism 
(Koch, 2013). The main problem with new regionalism, as it seems, resides in that it relativises the 
role of democratically elected actors as decision-making increasingly involves non-elected actors.  
 
2.1 The information function: public visibility and public attribution of 
responsibility 
Examining the institutional democratic anchorage of new regionalist arrangements is clearly a 
convincing way of assessing their democratic quality. However, the focus on democratic institutions 
somewhat overlooks the fact that electoral accountability not only depends on institutional 
procedures. Indeed, democratic accountability not only depends on the existence of institutional 
procedures of citizen control by which voters can hold decision-makers accountable - renew their 
mandate or throw them out of office. Democratic accountability is also conditional to voters’ ability 
to express satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with policy performance, identify decision-makers and 
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attribute responsibility for policy success or failure to political actors. Hence, democratic 
accountability is construed in processes of communication that help citizens form their opinion about 
policy performance and connect their appreciation of those whom they consider responsible. In mass 
democracies, these communication processes are not of an immediate and interindividual nature, 
but are mediated primarily by the mass media. Citizens can hold decision-makers accountable for 
their actions only when mass media provide information about policy decisions and their outcomes. 
Citizens’ perceptions of the political process, their evaluation of policy performance, their 
appreciation of parties and elected representatives are formed within processes of public debate. 
Thus, besides the institutional dimension, there is also a “communicational dimension” of democratic 
accountability, relating to the public sphere as one of the pillars for democratic legitimacy (see 
Habermas 1992).  
According to Bovens  "[a]ccountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and 
pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences" (2007: 450). In this regard, the relationship 
between representatives and the electorate is such a communicational relationship. But because 
representatives cannot directly communicate to the electorate, the mass media are the forum 
provided to the public of citizens where candidates dialogue with the electorate. However, this not 
only happens in the run-up of elections, but also between them. While elections are held on a regular 
basis (e.g. every four years), communication on policy performance and/or responsibility of decision 
makers is not limited to any particular period. Although there might be peaks of communicational 
activity at the time of elections, the media can and do inform on policy failures or successes 
continuously and independently of elections. Even though such information is politically relevant 
only in relation to some more or less distant moments of electoral control, the media are largely 
independent from electoral cycles and can thereby play the role of holding decision-makers 
accountable for their acts in periods between elections. Moreover, accountability of decision-makers 
not only means that they are assessed by the citizens via elections, but they are also evaluated 
against norms of conduct or standards defined by legal, administrative or professional forums 
(Bovens, 2007: 456); Romzek and Dubnick 1987: 230). In the media any actor of public interest can 
be held accountable with regard to a broad range of standards, triggering sanctions by the relevant 
forum - or influencing actor behaviour in anticipation of these sanctions.  Decision-makers, be they 
elected politicians or appointed officials, can be held accountable for the violation of legal norms, 
malpractice or incompetence - independently from elections. The media contribute to such legal, 
administrative or professional accountability of decision-makers by revealing violations of norms to a 
wider audience (e.g. through investigative journalism).  They “serve as citizens' eyes and ears to 
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survey the political scene and the performance of politicians”, as well as to “act as a public watchdog 
that barks loudly when it encounters misbehaviour, corruption, and abuses of power in the halls of 
government” (Graber, 2003: 143). The unwritten laws of political culture can force decision-makers 
to resign following ‘public pressure’ - even long before a violation of norms or standards has been 
legally established. It is clear that the media do not have formal sanctioning power on political actors. 
But they have the ability to "name and shame" them, i.e. make them visible to the public of citizens 
and enable the formation of a public opinion about who is responsible for what which will, 
eventually, lead to sanctions. We can therefore argue that the media take up a role of an 
autonomous “accountability forum” (Bovens, 2007) that is increasingly independent from electoral 
processes.  
This is potentially good news for democratic accountability in complex network governance 
advocated by new regionalism. Indeed, it means that the media provide an additional - 
communicational - channel by which public accountability of governance networks can be ensured 
beyond their "democratic anchorage" in mechanisms of electoral control (Sørensen and Torfing, 
2005). From a normative perspective, we can argue that the media have an information function, i.e. 
to inform the public adequately about what is going on in (metropolitan) politics and policy-making 
(Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990). This suggests that the media and the way they report metropolitan 
policy news generally reflects the relevance of respective policy actors.2 If the public is interested in 
knowing who is in charge of metropolitan policy-making and who is responsible for policy success 
and failure, media reporting will be driven by the quest to provide the audience with an accurate 
picture of the policy-making reality, and therefore to adequately cover those actors who have 
effective policy-relevance. The media will make those actors visible to the public, provide the 
information necessary to evaluate their performance, and thereby make them accountable to the 
electorate. Given the often complex nature of governance networks, this will be no simple task. But 
provided with adequate means, the media will eventually fulfil its democratic function to provide the 
public with information about who is responsible for what, irrespective of electoral status. Thanks to 
the media, policy relevant actors in governance networks can be identified and held accountable by 
the public - independently from their anchorage in democratic institutions and practice. In other 
words: there is no democratic deficit of governance networks, as longs as the media play their role 
appropriately.  
                                                          
2 Based on the theory of Niklas Luhmann, we consider the theoretical model of the public sphere or more 
generally the mass media to be a mirror of society (Spiegelmodell der Öffentlichkeit). See also Gerhards 1998: 
p. 269.  
 9 
2.2 Media bias: commercial pressure and news selection 
However, this is arguably quite a normative perspective about the role of the media in processes of 
political communication. Far from being neutral reporters of reality, the media interfere with the 
political content they communicate according to their own preferences and (commercial) interests. 
As Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) have argued, the media are not simply a mediating or intermediary 
agent whose function is to bridge the relation between a communicator and an audience as a 
substitute for interpersonal exchange. The term “the media” is misleading as it suggests the 
existence of a homogenous and monolithic bloc. In reality, the media is a system composed of a 
heterogenous multiplicity of competing actors who have their own preferences and interests. The 
media thereby add a specific bias to the information they process and to the political content they 
communicate (see Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 250-253).  
Given limited resources, mass media are highly selective in the events they report. Only 
‘newsworthy’ events are selected, according to ‘news value’ criteria (e.g. proximity, conflict, drama, 
personalization), determined by journalists’ worldviews, media production routines, but increasingly 
so by the commercial logic of the media industry. Media products sell well when they live up to the 
expectations of the audience, i.e. when they report about events that the audience finds 
'interesting'. With respect to politics, journalists can therefore be expected to have an attention bias 
towards elected decision-makers in comparison to appointed officials or non-elected policy-actors. 
Elections are institutionalised moments of power struggles and thus of public attention. Individuals 
standing up for election are therefore of higher news value to journalists than appointed or non-
elected decision-makers. As a consequence, this means that elected actors are likely to receive more 
media attention than non-elected actors. Moreover, as media seek commercial success, i.e. to 
maximise audience share, media actors can be inclined to “exaggerate their control functions and 
focus excessively on the negative aspects of politics” (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 252) and blame 
elected actors for policy failures even when the responsibility of these elected actors is unclear.  
Hence, we can hypothesise that media reporting about metropolitan policy-making will be biased in 
specific ways. Assuming an attention bias of the media towards elected actors, who are seen as more 
newsworthy than non-elected ones, we can expect that non-elected actors will be less often subject 
of media coverage on metropolitan policy-making, even when the institutional set up assigns them a 
crucial role. In addition, assuming that problems and scandals are considered more newsworthy than 
solutions and rule-conform behaviour, we can expect that negativism will prevail in media coverage 
on metropolitan policy-making, i.e. that actors are more often blamed for failures, rather than 
praised for success.  
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The media bias hypothesis therefore suggests a more tainted picture of democratic accountability of 
network governance in new regionalism. Not only does it mean that, due to media bias, media 
reports on metropolitan policy-making will be far from an accurate portrait of the actors involved, or 
of their responsibilities and merits. It also links the bias in this picture to the formal institutional 
arrangements, and notably the democratic anchorage of policy actors. The attention bias towards 
elected actors will make non-elected policy actors even less visible, and reduce the public's ability to 
hold them accountable for their acts. If the media bias assumptions are correct, the media will be far 
from compensating institutional democratic deficits of governance networks. Very much to the 
contrary: the institutional uncoupling of representative arenas from policy-making are reinforced 
through the communicational dimension of democratic accountability..  
3. Research Design and Data 
In this paper, we set out to explore the public accountability of elected and non-elected actors in 
metropolitan governance, by focusing on media reporting about metropolitan policy-making. The 
main objective is to establish whether media reporting - and hence the communicational dimension 
of democratic accountability - differs according to the institutional set up of metropolitan policy-
making, i.e. according to the mix of elected or non-elected actors involved . More precisely, we 
systematically compare the involvement of different types of policy actors in metropolitan policy-
making, their visibility in media reports, as well as the public attribution of responsibility they 
experience. The analysis is based on data on involvement of actors stemming from decision-analysis, 
as well as on content data of newspaper reporting on metropolitan policy-making in the fields of 
public transport and economic promotion. This section briefly presents the logic of case selection and 
describes the research design and the nature of the data collected. 
3.1 Case selection 
In terms of case selection, we decided to look at Switzerland, Germany, UK and France, in order to 
take into account potential differences between media systems as pointed out by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004). Switzerland and Germany represent the democratic corporatist model, UK the liberal, and 
France the polarized pluralist model. Hallin and Mancini (2004) describe the different degrees of 
commercialism in the three systems that might influence the reporting style. We therefore selected 
the mentioned four countries in order to control for media system effects as a potential intervening 
variable.  
With respect to the institutional set up of governance networks in metropolitan policy-making, we 
selected two large metropolitan areas in each of the four countries. The logic of case selection was to 
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maximise variance on the independent variable, i.e. the mix between elected and non-elected policy 
actors involved in area wide governance.  In each country, one metropolitan area with fully-fledged 
democratic institutions (metropolitan governments) was chosen, and one metropolitan area where 
area-wide governance primarily relies on governance networks (new regionalism). Zürich, Stuttgart, 
London and Lyon are cases with a metropolitan government, whereas new regionalism is 
predominant in area-wide policy-making in Bern, Berlin, Birmingham and Paris.  
While this institutional distinction allowed an informed ex ante guess about the institutional variance 
across the metropolitan areas under scrutiny, two policy fields were selected for the empirical 
analysis: public transport and economy promotion. Both of them are crucial to the development of 
metropolitan areas. Public transport is a key factor in the urban regional development to boost local 
economy in the competition of European territories (Brenner 2003). Further, public transport is a 
rather traditional policy field in the growth of urban regions, whereas economy promotion is a rather 
recent field of metropolitan policy-making and relates to the global competition of regional markets. 
3.2 Data sources: case studies and media content data 
To compare the involvement of actors in actual policy-making processes with their appearance in the 
media (visibility and attribution of accountability), we use two types of data.  
First, in-depth case studies of decision-making processes relevant to the two policy fields (public 
transport and economic promotion) under scrutiny were conducted in each metropolitan area, in 
order to identify the mix of actors involved in metropolitan policy-making. Similar to Maggetti (2009), 
the Actor-Process-Event-Scheme (APES) was used to analyse the involvement of actors in the policy-
making processes under scrutiny. The software systematizes information on events and their 
participating actors on a time scale. Public documents, newspapers and websites were searched to 
identify decision events within specific policy processes as well as participating actors. The product of 
each case study is an APES figure, on the basis of which participation of every actor or actor group in 
decision-making processes can be computed and compared across cases. In the subsequent analysis, 
we use these figures to measure the involvement of different types of policy actors in decision-
making processes in the two policy-fields under scrutiny. (A list of the analysed decision-processes 
can be found in the appendix. For a description of the procedure, as well as detailed case study 
results, see Christmann (2012).) 
Second, our analysis of media reporting uses content data from newspapers. For each metropolitan 
area, three relevant newspapers were selected, based on circulation figures numbers and local 
importance (the exception is Lyon, where only one locally relevant newspaper was found). For the 
collection of newspaper content data we followed the research strategy and coding scheme 
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developed by Gerhards et al. (2007).  In a first step, the digital archives of the selected newspapers 
were used to identify articles that reported on the fields of metropolitan policy-making (i.e. public 
transport and economic promotion) in the year 2010. The large sample of articles thus identified was 
then reduced via random selection to 200 articles for each metropolitan area (100 per policy field), 
weighted according to the proportion of articles published by each newspaper in the large sample.  
The content of these 1600 articles was coded by a team of student assistants, according to a 
standard procedure. Coding categories specified information on policy-actors that were mentioned 
at least once in an article, as well as public attributions of responsibilities, i.e. statements in which 
someone was made responsible by someone for a given policy, or was asked to (not) take action. 
Coding of public attributions of responsibility involved information on the sender, the addressee, as 
well as on the qualification (positive or negative) of a specific policy decision or outcome, or on an 
invitation to take action (cf. below).  
Table 1: Summarizes the comparative framework and the number of newspaper articles selected 
from eight metropolitan areas.  
 Switzerland Germany United Kingdom France 
Metropolitan Area Bern Zürich Berlin Stuttgart Birmingham London Paris Lyon 
Governance Type* NR MG NR MG NR MG NR MG 
Policy Field old/new old/new old/new old/new old/new old/new old/new old/new 
Nat. Media Sys.** DC DC DC DC LIB LIB PP PP 
News Articles  200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Nr. Of Newspapers 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 
*NR=New Regionalism, MG=Metropolitan Government 
**Media systems: DC=Democratic Corporatist, LIB=Liberal, PP=Polarized-Pluralist 
 
3.3 Operationalization of variables 
Oriented by the theoretical framework and hypothesis outlined above, the subsequent analysis aims 
explores the involvement of elected and non-elected actors in metropolitan policy-making, their 
visibility in media reports, as well as the extent to which they are publicly attributed responsibility for 
policy failures or success.  
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The distinction between elected and non-elected actors is operationalized according to their position 
in the democratic chain of delegation, i.e. the institutionalized mechanisms of sanctions based on 
electoral results. More precisely, we distinguish between elected and non-elected actors as well as a 
mixed category. The term “elected” is understood very broadly: the category 'elected actor' thus 
includes actors who are either directly elected by voters or accountable to an elected actor and 
therefore part of the democratic chain of delegation. Non-elected actors are those who are 
appointed to their position by other mechanisms than direct election, and who are not accountable 
to an elected actor. The mixed category represents collective actors (e.g. organisations or firms), in 
which both elected and non-elected actors exercise some form of control. Actors that do not fit any 
of these three categories are subsumed under others (e.g. parties, experts, citizens). (See appendix 
for details.)  
Involvement in metropolitan policy-making is measured by an actor's participation in the decision-
making processes examined in the detailed case studies (see appendix); 611 actors were thus 
identified. Visibility in media reports is measured on the basis of the mentions of an actor in the 
media articles (on the whole, 9062 different actors were mentioned at least once in the whole 
sample). Finally, 'accountability' measures the extent to which an actor is held accountable in the 
media, i.e. how often she/he is attributed responsibility for policy failure or success. Overall, 1812 
attribution addressees were found in the media content analysis. Responsibility attributions are 
categorized as positive responsibility attributions (attpos), negative responsibility attributions 
(attneg) and competence attributions (attcomp) (see Box). 
Box: the attribution of responsibility 
The attribution of responsibility refers to a specific iterative argument in text or speech. The 
attribution of (political) responsibility implies a specific constellation among actors which is: An 
attribution sender (AS), who attributes accountability to another actor, the attribution addressee 
(AA), who is linked to a specific metropolitan policy subject (AG) - in this case public transport and 
locational policy. The attribution pattern basically implies the question: Who is held accountable by 
whom in respect to what? In the same way competence can be attributed. This is not about who is to 
blame or to praise, but who should be responsible to take action. It is the negotiation of competence 
for problem solution. The endorsement of competence implies responsibility, but differs from 
responsibility attributions because implied causality is potentially open. The analogical question 
therefore is: Who should take action to do what?  
Gerhards et al. (2007) distinguish between attributions of success (positive) or failure (negative) and 
attributing responsibility for problem solutions, Having coded actors as attribution senders and 
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addresses, as well as the subjects of responsibility, coding the attribution character (positive or 
negative) completes one unit of analysis. The following sentences from coded newspaper articles 
serve as an illustration:  
Positive attribution of responsibility by a journalist (sender) with the Mayor as the addressee:  
“The Mayor’s policy successfully contributed to the quality of local transport in our city.”  
Negative attribution of responsibility by the Mayor (sender) to the Parliament (addressee):  
“The Mayor accused the Parliament of undermining his efforts to promote the local transport of the 
city by holding back money.” 
The second general distinction is between responsibility and competence attribution. Attributing 
responsibility for problem solution, a competence attribution, means that somebody should or 
should not be responsible for a given problem. The following example demonstrates such a 
competence attribution. 
Competence attribution by a business man (sender) to Birmingham city politicians as the addressee: 
 “These sorts of things should not be subject to the whims and prejudices of politicians who are only 
there for the short term. It has to transcend that.”  
In this example a top business man Mr. Pitchford (taken from the article context) as the attribution 
sender, complains that competence on the city region planning (“these sorts of things”, contextual 
interpretation) should not be in the hands of politicians. To disapprove competence, in terms of 
responsibility attribution, the attribution is to be coded as a negative competence attribution. In 
contrast, if somebody is considered to be capable to deal with policy situations, the competence 
attribution is identified as positive. 
 
Inter-coder reliability of the content analysis was tested in paired language groups on the basis of 
percentage agreement. Percent agreements among coders were tested on two different levels; 
article variables and attributions. Reliability tests were held during different stages of the coding 
procedure in order to control for possible changes during adoption of the codebook and language 
bias. Reliability tests of article variables (such as size, medium, author, and article type etcetera) 
turned out to be strong (percent agreement 0.83.) as well as the end-reliability test of attributions 
where the coders scored an average agreement of 75%. The pairwise agreements in the language 
groups differed from 55% up to 95% agreement. However, with regards to the complexity of the 
coding schema and compared to Gerhards’ study, reliability is considered to be acceptable although 
values ideally should be higher. 
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The following data analysis uses cross tables validated by Cramer’s V. All results are significant (.000) 
and Cramer’s V varies between 0.1 and 0.3.   
4. Empirical Findings  
The goal of this article is to assess the role of the media with respect to democratic accountability in 
network governance. We have seen that, from a normative point of view, the information function of 
the media in democratic societies can be assumed to result in the media accurately mirroring who is 
involved in metropolitan policy making and who is to be held accountable. We have contrasted this 
normative perspective with a media bias hypothesis, considering that due to media 
commercialization, media reporting on metropolitan policy-making will have an attention bias 
towards elected actors, and be replete with a negative tonality.  
The results are presented in three steps. The analysis generally uses case study data on the actual 
involvement of different actor types in metropolitan policy-making to compare it to their media 
visibility and accountability as measured by the media content analysis. In a first step, we combine 
data from all metropolitan areas and both policy fields under scrutiny. On this basis, the analysis is 
then further differentiated. In a second step, we distinguish between the two dominant models of 
metropolitan governance (i.e. consolidated institutions/ metropolitan government - type I 
governance - versus new regionalism - type II governance), in order to see whether the characteristic 
feature of the institutional context at the metropolitan level makes any difference. Third, we look at 
media-system effects, by differentiating the cases according to the three media-system category 
according to Hallin and Mancini (2004).  
4.1 Involvement, visibility and accountability of elected and non-elected actors 
The first figure shows the share of different actor types’ participation in policy processes in both 
policy fields across all eight metropolitan areas (involvement). Next to this, the visibility of actors in 
the media as well as their public accountability (addressee of attributions) is presented. Among the 
actor types, it can be seen that elected actors are by far the most important actor group across all 
three variables. Despite the new regionalist model followed by half of the metropolitan areas and, as 
a corollary, the expected involvement of many non-elected actors, elected actors represent more 
than 50% of all actors involved in metropolitan policy making processes. Moreover, elected actors 
are, unlike non-elected actors, politically accountable. Thus, the public accountability of elected 
actors is represented in the media in equal measure to their involvement, as we can see in the figure 
below (1). Despite the general lower media visibility of elected actors, in case of accountability 
responsibility is attributed to them. The second most involved actors are non-elected actors. Their 
role in metropolitan policy making processes is important, however, they are not institutionally 
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accountable to an electorate. Looking at figure 1 reveals that the media reflects the relevance of 
non-elected actors by making them the visible and thus attributable. Thus, we suggested in the 
theory section that non-elected actors might be less visible and less accountable in the media too. 
Figure 1 shows that this is not the case and that the importance of non-elected actors is generally 
represented in the media reality, at least in terms of media visibility. A possible explanation might be 
that non-elected actors are new to public accountability discourses; therefore they need more media 
visibility to become publically accountable. In contrast, elected actors are traditionally visible and 
daily figures in media reports. Moreover, since elected actors are politically accountable, their 
legitimacy does not depend on public accountability to the extent non-elected actors depend on it.  
Figure 1: Actor types by involvement, visibility and accountability in %  
 
Table 2: Actor types by involvement, visibility and accountability in %  
Actor Type Involvement (611) Visibility (9062) Accountability (1812) SE inv SE Vis SE Acc 
Other 8.2% 13.90% 7.40% 1.1% 0.4% 0.6% 
Elected 59.4% 53% 61.90% 2.0% 0.5% 1.1% 
Mixed 7.7% 6.50% 10.30% 1.1% 0.3% 0.7% 
Non Elected 24.7% 26.50% 20.50% 1.7% 0.5% 0.9% 
 
Above we confirmed that the share of the different actor types in involvement, visibility and 
accountability fairly corresponds in the political and the media reality. The interesting step is now the 
discussion of differences between the frequencies within the variables involvement, media visibility 
and public accountability of the different actor types under consideration of the standard error. As 
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we suggested in the theory part, we defined public accountability to be more meaningful than media 
visibility with regard to the communicational dimension of legitimacy. Furthermore, elected and non-
elected actors are in our focus.  
Looking at the frequencies only, elected actors are much less visible than they are involved, but in 
the same time more publically accountable. It could be a first indicator that elected actors are more 
in the focus of public accountabilty than they are actually involved in policy processes. However, 
looking at the standard errors of involvement and accountability shows that a possible bias cannot be 
aproved. The biggest difference between involvement and accountability seems to be in the group of 
non-elected actors. With regard to their involvement the trend seems to be reverse as non-elected 
actors are held less publically accountable. Moreover, looking at the the standard error of 
involvement and accountability leads to the conclusion that it is not a bias towards elected actors but 
maybe a bias towards a belittlement of the public accountability of non-elected actors.  
The figure above showed that the media generally mirror who is involved in metropolitan policy 
making processes. With regard to our second assumptions, looking only at the frequencies supports 
the hypothesis that there might be a bias towards elected actors. But looking at the deviation 
between the three variables does not support this assumption.   
Further, being held accountable in the media does not automatically mean that respective policy 
makers failed and are being blamed in the media. Being held accountable in public can also be 
affirmative for policy actors. Negative attributions blame the respective policy actor, whereas 
positive attributions confirm policy actors for their conduct. Figure 1b shows the extent of attribution 
characters, as explained in the methodology part, across all actor types.    
Figure 1b: Accountability of actor types by attribution types in % (N=1812) 
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According to the content analysis method applied, attributing public responsibility or competence to 
other actors or to oneself seems to follow certain patterns (c.f. Gerhards et al. 2007). As expected, 
we found approximately one third of all attributions to be competence attributions (positive and 
negative), one third positive causal attributions and one third negative causal attributions.  The most 
interesting attribution character is the negative ones. According to figure 1b, elected actors are more 
negatively held accountable in metropolitan news reporting than non-elected policy actors. Although 
the participation of non-elected actors in urban policy making cannot be sanctioned through political 
accountability, non-elected actors seems to be a lot less blamed in the media compared to elected 
actors. It seems that elected actors take more blame, because they politically accountable too. One 
explanation could be that non-elected actors are associated with being part of civil society. Usually 
civil society is evaluated more positively than political actors and receives less criticism. In contrast 
the media have a long lasting tradition in controlling politics. Therefore, independent from their real 
involvement in policy making, non-elected actors are judged more positively and getting blamed the 
least. It supports the suggestions above, that non-elected actors are less in the focus of public 
accountability although they are important in metropolitan policy making processes. 
However, to strengthen our arguments, the next figure presents the data divided according to 
governance types. Type I refers to an institutionalized metropolitan government (MG), whereas Type 
II stands for network arranged governance or new regionalism (NR). 
4.2 Governance types and public accountability 
As explained in the theory section, the organization of governance arrangements in metropolitan 
areas implies the involvement of different types of policy actors. In institutionalized governance 
arrangements, theory suggests that elected actors are important players in policy making, whereas in 
network based governance mixed and non-elected actors take over the role of policy makers. By 
splitting the data collected according to the two governance types, we can analyse whether the 
trends described before are holding true. 
First, we want to verify whether the media reflects the differences in metropolitan governance 
arrangements in terms of visibility and accountability of elected and non-elected actors. Looking at 
the shares of elected actors in metropolitan government and new regionalism reveals, as assumed, 
that the share of elected actors is higher in metropolitan governments (see figure 2). But whereas 
involvement and accountability of elected actors in metropolitan governments is almost equal, the 
public accountability of elected actors in new regionalism is considerably stronger with regard to 
their real involvement. Unfortunately, looking at the standard error in both governance types does 
not confirm the differences in the variable involvement and accountability.  
 19 
Figure 2: Involvement, media visibility and public accountability of actor types by governance types  
 
 
Table 3: Involvement, media visibility and public accountability of actor types by governance types  
Metro. Gov.  Involvement (338) Visibility (4586) Accountability (823) SE Inv SE Vis SE Acc 
Other 8.88% 15.30% 9.20% 1.5% 0.5% 1.0% 
Elected 61.83% 51.90% 62.00% 2.6% 0.7% 1.7% 
Mixed 5.92% 4.90% 6.00% 1.3% 0.3% 0.8% 
Non Elected 23.37% 28.00% 22.80% 2.3% 0.7% 1.5% 
New Region. Involvement (273) Visibility (4476) Accountability (989) SE Inv SE Vis SE Acc 
Other 7.33% 12.50% 5.90% 1.6% 0.5% 0.7% 
Elected 56.41% 54.30% 61.80% 3.0% 0.7% 1.5% 
Mixed 9.89% 8.20% 13.90% 1.8% 0.4% 1.1% 
Non Elected 26.37% 25.00% 18.50% 2.7% 0.7% 1.2% 
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As the variable involvement suggests, non-elected actors in metropolitan policy making processes of 
new regionalism are slightly more important than in metropolitan governments. Metropolitan areas 
where new regionalism predominates naturally have a bigger share of mixed actors. A similar pattern 
as in metropolitan governments holds true: the involvement and public accountability of non-elected 
actors is almost equal in metropolitan governments, whereas the difference in new regionalism is 
much stronger. Here, standard error allows the conclusion, that there is actually a slight bias towards 
a negligence of non-elected actors regarding their public accountability. In other words, we can say 
that although elected actors are not particularly more targeted in the media than they are actually 
involved, the media tends to reinforce the lack of accountability of non-elected actors especially in 
new regionalism.  
Looking at both types of governance in detail revealed that differences in shares of actor types are 
actually represented in the media discourse. This is in support of our first hypothesis, which assumes 
that the media mirror who is involved in local politics. Our second hypothesis, that there is a bias 
towards elected actors, has to be inverted. The presented data rather suggest inattention towards 
non-elected actor’s public accountability and thus reinforces their lack of institutional accountability.  
To further test if those differences prove their value when looking at different types of media 
systems is discussed in the next chapter.  
4.3 Media systems and public accountability  
Now we turn to our control variable that is represented by types of media systems (cf. Hallin and 
Mancini 2004). As suggested in the theory section, we expect, due to media commercialism, a 
stronger bias towards elected actors in the liberal media system. However, since the media system 
typology has been a target of criticism, we look not only at the liberal media system but at all three 
media systems to learn about other potential differences among the types. Thus, if there is a bias, we 
expect it to be the strongest in the liberal media system. Furthermore, we now also look whether the 
reversed bias towards non-elected actor exists.  
The next figure (3) shows the different shares of actor’s involvement, media visibility and public 
accountability across the three media systems. As expected, the general pattern remains: elected 
actors are the most dominant and non-elected the second most dominant actors in metropolitan 
policy making processes. However, in this section we are less interested in the differences between 
elected and non-elected actors as represented by different media systems, but more focused on a 
possible media bias (difference between involvement and public accountability).  
Looking at elected actors reveals the biggest difference in the involvement and public accountability 
to be in the Polarized Pluralist media system. It means that elected actors are held more accountable 
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than they are actually involved in local politics. Moreover, it is also in the Polarized Pluralist media 
system, where non-elected actors are held much less accountable than they actually are involved. 
Unfortunately standard errors are also the highest with regard to involvement and accountability in 
the Polarized Pluralist type. Both trends exist also in the Liberal media system but to a lower extent. 
Interestingly it is in the Democratic Corporatist media system where elected actors are held less 
accountable in public compared to their actual involvement. Additionally, in the Democratic 
Corporatist system the public accountability of non-elected actors corresponds to their real 
involvement.  
Figure 3: Involvement, media visibility and public accountability of actor types by media systems  
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Other Elected Mixed Non Elected
DC
Democratic Corporatist MS 
Involvement (262) Visibility (5012) Accountability (809)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Other Elected Mixed Non Elected
Lib
Liberal MS 
Involvement (244) Visibility (2060) Accountability (585)
 22 
 
Table 4: Involvement, media visibility and public accountability of actor types by media systems 
DC Involvement (262) Visibility (5012) Accountability (809) SE Inv SE Vis SE Acc 
Other 8.78 13.8 8.7 1.7 .5 1.0 
Elected 68.32 53.4 57.5 2.7 .7 1.6 
Mixed 5.72 8.5 16.1 1.4 .4 1.3 
Non Elected 17.81 24.3 17.8 2.3 .6 1.2 
Lib Involvement (244) Visibility (2060) Accountability (585) SE Inv SE Vis SE Acc 
Other 9.02 19.1 8.4 1.9 .9 1.1 
Elected 52.05 45.1 63.6 3.2 1.1 2.0 
Mixed 7.79 4.3 2.2 1.7 .4 .6 
Non Elected 31.14 31.5 25.8 3.0 1.0 1.8 
PP Involvement (105) Visibility (1990) Accountability (418) SE Inv SE Vis SE Acc 
Other 4.76 8.8 3.6 2.0 .6 .9 
Elected 54.29 60.3 67.9 4.8 1.1 2.3 
Mixed 12.38 4.0 10.3 3.4 .4 1.5 
Non Elected 28.57 26.9 18.2 4.3 1.0 1.9 
 
In the theory part we suggested that the media of the Liberal media system are stronger biased 
towards elected actors compared to the other two models. Since media commercialism is expected 
to be the highest in the Liberal media system, the media is assumed to focus more on the 
newsworthy elected actors than non-elected actors. However, our dataset does not provide evidence 
for this hypothesis. Strong political parallelism, as given in the Polarized Pluralist media system, could 
also be an explanation for the bias there. In contrast we identified another possible bias.  In the case 
of the Liberal and the Polarized Pluralist media systems, non-elected actors seem to be more in 
favour of the media and are thus held less accountable than their involvement suggests. 
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5. Conclusions 
Democratic multilevel governance, whether it is institutionalized or network based, requires that the 
media portray and represent the complexity of policy actors. It allows that those actors can be 
controlled and be potential subject to public accountability. “Accountability as a virtue is important, 
because it provides legitimacy to public officials and public organizations” (Bovens 2010: 954). In line 
with our operationalization, public accountability is important because it is a source of legitimacy 
that can be measured. Just as Bovens, who distinguishes in his analysis of democratic accountability 
between politicians and civil servants, we also looked at non-elected actors. Whereas politicians have 
to behave responsive towards parliaments, the media and to respective stakeholders, civil servants 
refrain from the public and remain loyal to their principal. Similarly, the lack of political accountability 
of non-elected actors jeopardizes their legitimacy. The duty of politicians to be publically accountable 
seems to be traditionally stronger than for civil servants or non-elected actors. But in complex 
multilevel arrangements like within new forms of regionalism, the dichotomy between politicians 
and civil servant seems not to be appropriate anymore. Thus, our approach to also look at the 
communicational legitimacy of non-elected actors helped to fill a research gap. Moreover, looking at 
our data, it turned out that the media can keep up with the complexity of multilevel politics to a 
quite surprising extent.  
Analysing involved policy actors across metropolitan regions in detail and comparing their visibility in 
the news with their public accountability warrants to conclude that the media show a quite nuanced 
picture of who is involved and who is to be held accountable. The case study and media content data 
provided for all cases support our rather optimistic assumption that the media mirror who is 
involved. However, the data also show that non-elected actors are held less accountable compared 
to their visibility and their real importance in public policy making. Against our assumption that the 
media might focus more on elected actors in public, the analysis revealed a revers trend in 
accountability discourses. Additionally, non-elected actors are the ones who receive the smallest 
amount of negative attributions (blame) when looking at different attribution types. Moreover, they 
are evaluated more positively then others. Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that standard 
errors are only in favour of a bias towards a disregard of public accountability of non-elected actors.  
Furthermore, due to a stronger involvement of non-elected actors, the lack of democratic 
accountability is assumed to be higher in new regionalism (type II). The legitimacy of metropolitan 
governments (type I) benefits from the political accountability and public accountability of elected 
actors despite the high involvement of non-elected actors. However, looking at the public 
accountability of non-elected actors suggest that their lack of institutional legitimacy is rather 
reinforced than compensated in the media. Regarding our hypothesis of media commercialisation, 
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we could not identify a bias towards elected actor’s public accountability which is strengthened by 
the Liberal media system. In contrast, the strongest difference between involvement and public 
accountability was found in the Polarized Pluralist media system. A possible explanation could be the 
strong political parallelism that is characteristic for these media systems.  
Taken together, the data presented implies a rather mixed image of public accountability, which is 
also shown by low Cramèr’s V and high standard errors. Some of the data tends to show evidence 
that media system effects are overestimated. Different journalist or media traditions within these 
metropolitan regions could bias our picture of the communicational dimension of legitimacy. 
Unfortunately, we cannot discuss those dimensions in the scope of this analysis.  
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7. Methodological Appendix 
A) Actors categories 
Elected versus 
Non-Elected Subcategory Decision Rule for coding Examples 
Elected Actors 
 
Directly Elected 
Actors 
Actors that consist solely 
of directly elected 
representatives. 
Parliaments, Mayors, 
Presidents 
Indirectly Elected 
Actors 
Actors that consist of 
representatives that are 
part of the chain of 
delegation. 
Prime Minister, 
administration, public 
agencies 
Mixed 
 
Semi-Elected 
Actors 
Collective actors that 
consist at least of one 
directly or indirectly 
elected actor, but also of 
non-elected actors. 
Public agencies, public 
private partnerships 
Non-Elected 
Actors 
 
Profit oriented 
Interest Groups 
Actor pursues self-
oriented goals on behalf 
of its members or clients. 
Unions, chamber of 
commerce, business 
associations, Private 
economy 
Non-profit groups/ 
Social 
Mouvements 
Actor aims at increasing 
common goods for 
society. 
Environmental groups, Social 
Organizations 
Others 
Non-Elected 
Actors with 
specific 
functional / 
accountability 
logic/ 
Electorate 
 
Political Parties Partisan group that aims at running for office. Any political party 
Media Actor reports on policy processes. 
Journalists, Newspapers, 
Broadcasting 
Experts 
Network participation is 
based on consultation of 
the actor’s expertise. 
Actor does not have a 
policy preference. 
Judges, Courts, Legal Experts, 
University working groups 
Citizens 
Unorganized groups of 
citizens that are not part 
of any of the other actor 
categories. 
Individuals, voters, 
neighborhoods,  passengers, 
clients, etc. 
 
B) List of newspaper selection  
Metro Area Newspaper Metro Area Newspaper 
Bern Bund London The Guardian 
Bern B.Z.  London The Independent 
Bern 20 Minuten (Bern) London Evening Standard, London 
Zürich Tagesanzeiger Birmingham Birmingham Ev. Mail 
Zürich Zürichsee-Zeitung Birmingham Birmingham Post 
Zürich 20 Minuten (Zürich) Birmingham Solihull News (weekly) 
Berlin Berliner Morgenpost Paris Le Parisien 
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Berlin Berliner Zeitung Paris Le Figaro 
Berlin Märkische Allgemeine (MAZ) Paris La Croix 
Stuttgart Stuttgarter Zeitung Lyon Le Progrès  
Stuttgart Stuttgarter Nachrichten  
Stuttgart Nürtinger Zeitung 
 
C) Case studies  
Table D1: Analyzed transport planning in the eight metropolitan areas 
Metropolitan Area Political Process 
Zürich Rahmenkredit ZVV 2012-2013 
Bern  Angebotskonzept 2010–2013,  Regionale Verkehrskonferenz Bern-Mittelland 
Berlin  Local Transport Plan Berlin 2006-2009,  (Local Transport Plan Brandenburg, Contract with S-Bahn) 
Stuttgart  Regional Transport Plan, 2001 
London Mayor's Transport Strategy 2008 
Birmingham  Local Transport Plan 2006 
Paris  Le Plan de Déplacements Urbains d’Ile de France  (2000, 2011) 
Lyon  Le Plan de Déplacements Urbains, revision 2005 
 
Table D2: Analyzed locational promotion processes in the eight metropolitan areas 
Metropolitan Area Political Process 
Zürich Setup of the Greater Zurich Area 1998 
Bern  Setup of the Wirtschaftsraum Bern, March 2011 
Berlin  Setup of  the Capital Region as a joint campaign for location promotion 2006 
Stuttgart  Setup of Wirtschaftsförderung Region Stuttgart 1995 
London  London Development Strategy 2010 
Birmingham  Setup of Regional Development Agency (Advantage West Midlands) 1998  
Paris  Setup of L'Agence de Développement 2001 
Lyon  Setup of Only Lyon 2007 
 
 
 
